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Abstract - Finland has one of the last fully monopolistic gambling sectors in Europe. Unlike in most Western European countries, 
the monopoly is also consolidated and enjoys a wide support as opposed to license-based competition. This paper analyses 
whether this preference for monopoly provision is due to the particularities of the Finnish society or rather to those of the Finnish 
gambling sector. We do this by comparing public discourses in media texts (N=143) from 2014 to 2017 regarding monopolies 
operating in alcohol retail, rail traffic and gambling sectors. The results show that gambling appears to be special even in the 
Finnish national context. While the Finnish alcohol retail and railroad traffic markets have been liberalised during the study period, 
the gambling monopoly has been concurrently strengthened despite similar political and international pressures towards 
dismantling. The discussion suggests that the differing outcomes reflect the varying positions of monopolies, their stakeholders 
and the justifications put forward. Intertwined stakeholder interests in the gambling sector appear to amplify consensus politics 
and set gambling apart from the other cases.   
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Introduction 
State monopolies are increasingly opened to 
competition across European jurisdictions. Monopoly 
policy is not only a question of national preference, as 
regulatory choices are subject to both national and 
international constraints, including constitutions, 
international trade agreements and the impact of 
European Union institutions. According to Article 37 of 
the Lisbon Treaty, European Union (EU) Member States 
are obliged to adjust state monopolies to ensure that 
there is no discrimination between companies from 
different Member States. The International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) have also spurred 
liberalizations of national trade regulations and the 
dismantling of monopoly structures (Geradin, 1999). In 
national contexts, the de-monopolization trend has 
been further driven by the ideology of free markets as 
the best means of advancing prosperity and welfare 
(Davies, 2017; Harvey, 2005). The efficiency generated 
via reduced state intervention and international 
competition has become a dominant political framing, 
replacing economic policies that support national state-
controlled industries even in traditionally state-
dominated sectors (di Giulio, 2016).  
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Like other EU Member States, Finland has liberalized its 
economy in line with economic globalization and its 
membership of the European Union in 1995. 
Corporatization of state enterprises began in the 1980s 
and 1990s, followed later by privatizations to balance 
the public deficit (Patomäki, 2007). An economic 
recession in the early 1990s after the collapse of trade 
relationships with the Soviet Union gave a further boost 
to reforming the public economy (Hellman, Monni, & 
Alanko, 2017; Patomäki, 2007). When the newly elected 
right-wing government published its Government 
Programme in May 2015, its priorities included 
balancing the public deficit and generating economic 
growth by restructuring the public sector; 
strengthening the competitiveness of the private 
sector; and relaxing market regulations 
(Valtioneuvoston kanslia, 2015). Nevertheless, the 
Finnish state continues to operate a variety of 
monopolistic sectors, notably in gambling (Veikkaus), 
alcohol retail (Alko) and passenger rail traffic (VR, 
Valtion rautatiet).  
At a first glance, these monopolistic structures 
appear to be specific to the Finnish system. In alcohol 
retail, only Finland and its Nordic neighbours Norway, 
Sweden and Iceland continue to restrict the sale of 
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stronger alcoholic beverages and wine in state 
monopoly shops within Europe (European Alcohol 
Policy Alliance, 2016). Regarding passenger rail traffic, 
legislative initiatives of the European Commission (EC) 
have significantly opened markets since 1991. 
Monopolistic configurations currently remain in 
passenger traffic in countries like Finland, Greece and 
Croatia, although freight transport has been liberalized 
(see Crozet, 2016). As for gambling, Finland is one of the 
few remaining countries in Europe where the entire 
gambling field is controlled by one monopolistic 
operator, and in which one of the main goals of 
gambling policy is to maintain this monopolistic 
system. In 2017, the Finnish monopoly system was 
further strengthened by merging three separate 
monopolistic actors in the field (Veikkaus, RAY and 
Fintoto) into one monopoly (Veikkaus). Contrary to the 
alcohol and rail traffic sectors, no segment has been 
opened to the private sector.  
However, the operation of gambling has also been 
argued to differ from other restricted economic sectors 
in that it produces higher than average economic 
returns mainly due to a low price of production that is 
independent of bet sizes, and overconsumption of 
gambling products by those who play excessively 
(Young & Markham, 2017). These high economic returns 
produce significant financial interests and path-
dependencies that are often difficult to reverse (Jensen, 
2017). Such interests can result in protectionist policies 
to prevent funds generated via gambling operation 
from leaving national jurisdictions (Smith, 2000), but 
also to spur de-monopolizations of gambling industries 
owing to increased governmental revenue needs or 
effective lobbying (e.g., Sulkunen et al., 2019). Opening 
gambling operations to licensing has been increasingly 
popular across Western Europe in recent years, while 
many Eastern and Central European jurisdictions have 
concurrently monopolized previously liberal gambling 
markets (e.g., Marionneau, Nikkinen, & Egerer, 2018).  
Differing monopoly policy trajectories within the 
European Union have been possible because EU 
institutions allow market restrictions due to reasons 
that are of greater value for societies than competitive 
policy (see Blum & Logue, 1998). The principle of 
subsidiarity, as defined by the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU), safeguards the position 
of Member States to take decisions in matters which are 
not better achieved at the Union level. In the same 
treaty, the principle of proportionality maintains that 
the actions of the EU must be limited to what is 
necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties. 
Discriminatory measures in the gambling sector, as in 
any other sector, can be justified if they fall under the 
exceptions provided in articles 55 and 46 of the EC 
Treaty: public order, security, or health. The acceptable 
justifications utilized to restrict competition and to 
maintain monopolistic operations have varied between 
sectors. Public health has been regarded as a national 
concern, and therefore a legitimate justification for 
monopolies in fields such as gambling (e.g., Marionneau 
et al., 2018) and alcohol (Holden & Hawkins, 2017; 
Room, 1993), although monopolistic configurations in 
both sectors have also been justified in terms of 
providing public revenue (Marionneau et al., 2018; 
Room, 1993; Selin, Hellman, & Lerkkanen, 2019). The 
significant national implications, ‘naturalness’ and 
historical importance in fields such as transportation 
and energy policy have, on their part, given Member 
States significant leeway to restrict competition for 
transportation (see Casullo & Zhivov, 2017; Knieps, 
2015) and for energy (see Jamasb & Pollitt, 2005; 
Kanellakis, Martinopoulos, & Zachariadis, 2013).  
The conformity of Member State policies with the 
principles set forth in the TFEU can be challenged via 
CJEU (Court of Justice of the European Union) 
proceedings often employed by outside operators 
looking to penetrate monopolistic markets (Örnberg & 
Tammi, 2011); European Commission infringement 
proceedings and letters of formal notice or reasoned 
opinions for Member States to clarify their legislation; or 
via recommendations issued to Member States (e.g., 
Littler, 2011) . These channels of influence have resulted 
in many European countries opening up their national 
monopolies in the gambling sector but have also been 
behind some of the developments to strengthen the 
Finnish gambling monopoly by means of increased 
consumer protection (Örnberg & Tammi, 2011). In 1999 
the CJEU (case ECJ Läära C-124-97) ruled that the 
Finnish monopoly system is in line with European Union 
legislation provided that gambling-related problems 
will be addressed more efficiently. In 2006, the 
European Commission initiated infringement 
proceedings against several Member States including 
Finland (IP/06/436) regarding restrictions on remote 
sports betting that is licensed in other Member States. 
These proceedings were closed in 2013, alongside an 
announcement from the Commission that it would not 
take further measures to challenge the Finnish 
gambling monopoly.    
This paper provides a comparative analysis of public 
discourses on three policy developments surrounding 
state monopolies in the Finnish gambling, alcohol and 
railway passenger traffic markets.  We ask whether the 
monopolistic structure and lack of willingness to open 
the gambling markets for competition are due to 
particularities of the Finnish gambling sector, or to 
national policy preferences that would also be visible in 
other monopolistic sectors? The material consists of 
press items collected from the leading national 
mainstream newspaper, Helsingin Sanomat, between 
2015 and 2017 – a period characterized by the 
government’s strongly articulated aim to dismantle 
public governance rules and norms (Valtioneuvoston 
kanslia, 2015). In what follows, we will first discuss the 
impact of the European Union on the monopoly policies 
of Member States, introduce our data and 
methodology, analyse the public discussion 
surrounding the Finnish alcohol, railway passenger 
traffic, and gambling monopolies, and finally discuss 
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the implications of the similarities and differences 
between these monopoly processes.  
 
Methods and data 
The data analysed in this study are collected from the 
Finnish newspaper, Helsingin Sanomat (HS, circulation 
around 300 000). HS is the largest daily newspaper in 
the Nordic countries and an important medium for 
sustaining a consensual democracy. The Nordic system 
is characterized by a support for broad coalitions (e.g., 
Jónsson, 2014), which often translates into support for 
mainstream political ideas and the ruling government 
in the HS (Nieminen, 2010). HS reporting constitutes an 
appropriate data source for analysing of how political 
processes are negotiated, and which kinds of actors are 
involved in the public discussion. As opposed to for 
example interview data, media material provides 
insight into how views on questions and phenomena 
develop in the public over time as well as reflecting a 
political system and forming questions as part of it 
(Christians, Glasser, McQuail, Nordenstreng, & White, 
2010; Hellman, 2010). 
The material was collected using the search word 
‘monopoli’ (monopoly) in the HS publication archive 
(online and print). The search period covered three 
years between September 2014 and October 2017. The 
items covering the most vivid recent debates in the 
three monopoly cases were selected resulting in a 
corpus of 143 texts covering reports, interviews, 
opinion pieces and analyses, short notices and even 
satire. 
The studied period was crucial for the political 
negotiations on the future of alcohol retail, rail traffic 
and gambling in Finnish society due to shifts in political 
power towards the market liberal right in 2015. 
Although the dismantling of the rail transportation 
monopoly was already announced before 2014, the 
opening of rail traffic markets received public attention 
in 2015 with the instalment of the new Minister of 
Transport, Anne Berner. The data on the railway 
monopoly discussions consists of 53 press items. The 
alcohol retail monopoly became an object of public 
discussion in 2015 as part of the government’s 
restructuring of state institutions and their plans to 
renew the Alcohol Act. The media material on the 
alcohol state monopoly question covers 47 text pieces. 
The public discussion on the gambling monopoly 
occurred in the period preceding the announcement of 
a merger as of January 2017. The material consists of 43 
text pieces.  
We approached the corpus of texts inductively by 
discerning justifications and processes of agenda 
setting in the discussions. To construct a comparative 
analytical framework, we used concepts of Kingdon’s 
(1984) Multiple Streams Framework (MSF). According to 
the MSF theory, policy change takes place though three 
‘streams’: The problem stream refers to public 
awareness to issues requiring solutions; the policy 
stream refers to proposals for change; and the politics 
stream is related to a favourable political climate, 
usually brought about by a change in government or 
public opinion. The realisation of new public policies 
and government agendas becomes possible through 
changes in the problem stream or the political stream, 
opening a policy window, that a policy entrepreneur 
can use to advance their agenda. 
The MSF model enables an interpretation of how 
depicted political processes and their main regulatory 
justifications may play decisive roles in decisions 
regarding market liberalization and state control. The 
model has been widely applied in previous research. A 
recent systematic review of studies applying the MSF 
model (Jones et al., 2016) found a total of 311 studies 
investigating topics such as health, environment, 
governance, education and welfare. In studies on 
national monopolies, Herweg (2015) analysed the 
demonopolization of European natural gas markets in 
the late 1980s and found that the necessary policy 
window opened when the European Commission 
succeeded in framing energy matters as a competition 
issue, which eventually broke down Member State 
resistance and led to the European gas directive.  
Because the interest of the current paper is not in 
analysing the policy processes but rather the nature of 
public discourses, the MSF model was not applied 
directly but, rather, used as a conceptual tool to help 
comparison. Comparative applications of the MSF 
model are still in early stages, and comparisons 
between national sectors rather than between country 
cases have appeared only recently (Tosun & Workman, 
2017). Furthermore, despite an initial attempt to apply 
the MSF framework more methodologically in this 
analysis, the consensual political culture in Finland 
(Marionneau & Kankainen, 2018) did not translate well 
to analysing policy streams through policy alternatives 
as is highlighted in a more theoretical application of the 
MSF model. The consensus striving policy modus 
operandi articulated in HS instead seems to lead to a 
blurring of streams and infringement on stream 
independence. For these reasons, we have instead used 
the model as an analytical and conceptual tool to 
enable a comparison of discursive traits in the three 
monopoly cases. In order to do this, we have looked at 
the policy processes through three developments: 
identifying and justifying a problem with the current 
system (problematisation); presented solutions (policy); 
and a favourable political context (politics).  
The political context is similar in all cases: Public 
discussion on the alcohol retail, passenger rail traffic 
and gambling monopolies followed a change of 
government in Finland in May 2015, and the liberal 
economic policies of the government agenda, including 
restructuring the economy through de-
monopolizations. Problematisations and policy 
solutions, as well as the actors participating in public 
discussion, nevertheless differ. The presentation of 
problems varies between the three cases in terms of 
how the need for policy change is justified and the kinds 
of solutions that are offered. The monopoly cases are 
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analysed separately in the results and then compared 
more generally in the discussion.  
 
Results 
 
Passenger rail traffic 
The initial push for opening the Finnish rail transport 
market came from the European Commission’s efforts 
to strengthen the position of railways vis-à-vis other 
modes of transport, particularly for environmental 
reasons (European Commission, 2011) and subsequent 
railway package directives. The Commission has 
suggested strengthening the competitive advantage of 
rail transport through 1) opening the rail markets to 
competition, 2) improving the safety and inter-
operability of national networks and 3) developing rail 
transport infrastructure (see European Commission, 
2019). However, in the material under study, only the 
opening of markets received attention.  
The rail traffic discussion is an example of a de-
monopolization process. The contractual monopoly of 
VR in national passenger rail traffic is set to be opened 
for competition as of 2024, and the Helsinki 
metropolitan passenger traffic contracts will be 
renegotiated in 2021. Although these changes were 
already decided on before 2015, a change of 
government and the instalment into office of Anne 
Berner as Minister of Transport, rekindled public 
discussion on the structural problems in rail traffic. The 
active participants in the discussion were the 
government, the European Commission and VR 
officials. Based on the material analysed, the 
preparation and realisation stages were not yet publicly 
discussed, but the question was negotiated through 
legitimisations and justifications. 
Initial problematizations materialized in the 
reporting in 2015 when HS (28.8.2015) recounts how in 
the past six years, the number of VR employees has 
been reduced by 4,000. Further layoffs were announced 
in 2015 in addition to restructuring, including cuts on 
the number of lines and ticket offices. The report states 
that VR had a deficit of 1.9 million Euros between April 
and June 2015. In the economy section of the same HS 
issue (28.8.2015) these problems are attributed to a 
crisis in rail traffic, emanating from competition from 
low-cost buses and airlines, and an unfavourable image 
of VR due to the reduced service network. On 
September 1st, 2015, a press summary suggests that de-
monopolization is necessary and beneficial to 
consumers.  
The consensual view on the benefits of de-
monopolization is challenged following three 
developments: The first is related to problems in 
passenger transport. In September of 2015, the Y-train 
line, operating within the Helsinki region, was 
announced to be terminated. HS reports that local MPs 
want to find a solution (24.9.2015) and argues in favour 
of maintaining the VR monopoly, as it would oblige the 
service provider to offer service even on unprofitable 
routes. Abolishing the monopoly is speculated to lead 
to more significant reductions in rail connections as well 
as stripping VR workers of benefits. When VR announces 
that it might open some unprofitable lines for 
competition already before 2024, HS titles its news 
piece: ‘Feel welcome to operate on deficit’ (3.10.2015). 
The discussion on passenger transport concludes when 
VR announces that the Y-train will continue operation 
(3.12.2015). 
The second form of criticism emerges in late 2015 
and relates to freight transportation. Rail freight traffic 
was already opened to competition in 2007, but as of 
2015 only small local firms had shown interest, and VR 
still dominated the sector (1.10.2015). HS reports 
potential competitors’ arguments that VR is blocking 
access by scrapping old trains rather than selling them, 
and by overcharging on maintenance (4.10.2015). 
Finland has a different rail width to the rest of Europe 
which, together with harsh winter conditions, 
complicates the import of trains. Governmental actors 
are also seen to hinder competition through 
administrative hurdles, while Finnish customers are 
reluctant to change providers. Similar problems are 
projected on passenger traffic, and the president of the 
rail workers union, Vesa Mauriala, argues that opening 
passenger traffic to competition would mean ‘dividing 
Finnish national wealth’ or ‘sacrificing national wealth 
on political bases’. Meanwhile, the CEO of VR, Mikael 
Aro, claims that the financial crisis is behind the lack of 
competition (1.10.2015).  
The third criticism is political, and emerges in early 
2016 (e.g., 29.1.2016; 30.1.2016; 19.4.2016). Although 
the de-monopolization was initiated years before, it 
begins to revolve around the newly appointed Minister 
of Transport Anne Berner. Berner is portrayed as a 
market liberal and a partisan of de-monopolizations 
(29.1.2016), but also as a representative of the Finnish 
Centre party, which has a strong stake in developing 
remote regions’ access to services. MP for the populist 
right-wing party True Finns, Ville Taivio (9.8.2017) 
questions whether Anne Berner is truly thinking about 
the passengers, or whether her actions are ideological.  
Despite these trails of criticism, Anne Berner pushes 
her agenda and reporting focuses on practicalities. The 
policy discussion focuses on advancing the 
governmental proposal rather than discussing other 
alternatives. HS reports on the need to split the VR 
group into three: material, real-estate and maintenance. 
This split is seen as the prerequisite for true markets, as 
VR is the only actor able to provide trains and 
maintenance equipped for Finnish conditions 
(19.4.2016). Another practical question focuses on the 
unprofitable rail lines. Berner suggests creating route 
bundles to oblige providers to also operate unprofitable 
lines. The decision to dismantle the VR passenger rail 
traffic monopoly is justified further during 2017.  
Neighbouring Sweden had already opened its railroad 
markets in 2001, which has reportedly increased usage 
and decreased prices (13.8.2017). However, the Railroad 
Union argues that Finland would not follow the 
Swedish example because VR would have to rent out its 
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trains to other operators due to the Finnish rail width 
(10.8.2017). The criticism from VR does not attract more 
public discussion. Opposing voices appear to quietly 
die down and the de-monopolization process becomes 
accepted as a fait accompli.  
Criticism towards the de-monopolization mainly 
emanated from VR, while the government and the 
European Commission actively promoted the reform. 
This left little room for discussion on alternatives, 
allowing Berner to advocate her version of the rail 
reform. HS quotes her justifying the de-monopolization 
with cheaper tickets and more innovative markets 
(18.8.2017): ‘Only a market economy and competition 
create something new’. Together with environmental 
reasons, these justifications in favour of de-
monopolization gain more importance in the 
discussion, and arguments in favour of the monopoly 
start to quiet down. At least a semblance of consensus 
was reached in the public discussion of rail 
deregulation.  
 
Alcohol 
As a political question, the Finnish alcohol retail 
monopoly (Alko) is surrounded by significant moral 
tensions and requirements for social responsibility (e.g., 
Warsell, 2007). The de-monopolization process is also 
more tentative and gradual than in the VR case. Alko has 
an effective monopoly on the retail of strong alcohol 
and wine, but derogations to the monopoly for softer 
alcoholic beverages already existed before the 
discussion under analysis. The studied period coincided 
with further weakening of Alko’s position due to new 
relaxations in alcohol legislation.  
The discussion on the alcohol law reform in HS 
follows a very similar arc to that of the VR case. The 
politics in the reform of Finnish alcohol law coincide 
with the change of government in 2015. Although 
alcohol law reform had already been on the agenda for 
years, it had failed to move forward due to political 
disagreements. The previous government led by the 
Social Democratic Party had suggested reducing the 
availability of alcohol, but the proposition was met with 
public outrage and later cancelled. In fear of a similar 
reaction, the Centre Party, despite its traditions in the 
temperance movement, is reportedly pro-liberalization 
(14.8.2015). 
Problematizations regarding the existing alcohol 
law re-emerge during 2015. HS reports (2.2.2015) that 
the unions in the grocery, alcohol and tourism sectors 
want to hamper private alcohol imports from Estonia by 
reducing alcohol taxation and by introducing stronger 
beer and wine to supermarkets. At the time, strong 
beverages were only available in Alko shops, while 
other retailers were authorized to sell mild beer and 
drinks containing a maximum of 4.7 percent alcohol. A 
consensus seems to be found regarding the need to 
relax alcohol legislation, and discussion on the 
practicalities follows in the autumn of 2015. Minister of 
Industry, Olli Rehn (Centre Party) announces that he 
would allow wine in supermarkets (7.9.2015), as 
supermarkets near Alko shops have an unfair 
competitive advantage (HS 12.12.2015). Allowing all 
supermarkets to sell wine would create a fairer market. 
Members of the right-wing Coalition party and the 
populist right-wing True Finns support the proposition. 
The preparation of the law begins in October 2015 
(16.10.2015). Juha Rehula, Minister of Social Affairs and 
Health (Centre Party), appoints a working group to 
consider both public health concerns and the needs of 
the Finnish economy in a new Alcohol Act (3.11.2015). 
Rehula does not want the new law to challenge the 
monopoly position of Alko nor to introduce changes in 
taxation. Rather, the focus would be on increasing 
consumption in restaurants (11.2.2016). The reporting 
in HS is largely in favour of relaxations. HS quotes Kari 
Paaso from the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, 
who, although in favour of a public health framing, 
argues in this case that the reform will deregulate some 
‘ridiculous restrictions’ such as portion sizes and limited 
serving areas. HS offers further justifications for 
deregulation by stating that the current alcohol law is a 
copy of the 1932 law that originally overturned 
prohibition (19.10.2015).  
A draft proposal by Juha Rehula’s working group is 
presented in February 2016 (22.2.2016), but 
government partners disagree on its contents, 
weighing in industry interests. The pro-liberalization 
Coalition Party argues that stronger alcohol should be 
sold in supermarkets to support the small brewery 
industry and to compete with imports from Estonia and 
restaurants should be allowed to sell take-out alcohol. 
The True Finns support small breweries’ rights to 
directly sell their products. Both parties support longer 
alcohol selling hours for supermarkets. The Centre Party 
does not agree with these propositions as they would 
directly challenge the monopoly position of Alko. The 
only proposition the parties agree on is to reduce the 
VAT of alcohol sold in restaurants. The discussion 
between the political parties remains blocked for some 
time (29.3.2016). HS attributes this to the reluctance of 
some Centre Party MPs towards any liberalizations in 
alcohol policy (13.5.2016).  
In addition to governmental actors, the discussion 
picks up amongst other stakeholders seeking to push 
their agendas. The president of the Finnish Grocery 
Trade Association Kari Luoto argues that relaxing 
regulations would not threaten the position of Alko, as 
strong alcoholic beverages (over 4.7 percent alcohol 
content) represent a marginal market (2.4.2016). In an 
opinion piece, a Helsinki-based entrepreneur argues 
that liberalization of alcohol laws would improve 
employment and the quality of services (13.5.2016). 
Opposing voices come from researchers Pia Mäkelä and 
Juhani Eskola at the National Institute of Health and 
Welfare (30.4.2016) who argue that ‘The mere joy of 
simplifying regulations should not be a reason to 
worsen national health and the national economy’. 
Representatives of Alko are also against the new alcohol 
law. Hille Korhonen, CEO of Alko, warns that bringing 
stronger alcohol to supermarkets would close Alko 
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shops (5.5.2016) whereas the chairman of Alko’s board 
of administration, Vesa-Matti Saarakkala justifies his 
opposing position with increased harm caused by 
alcohol (12.5.2016).  
By the end of May 2016, the government parties are 
finally reported to propose and agree on draft 
legislation. This draft includes longer opening times for 
restaurants; allowing supermarkets, kiosks and gas 
stations to sell stronger alcohol; permitting small 
breweries to sell their products directly to consumers; 
prolonging Alko shop opening hours by one hour 
during weekdays, as well as authorising wine auctions 
and Alko selling vans; streamlining restaurant service 
rights and allowing restaurants to sell alcohol to be 
consumed elsewhere; permitting 16-year-olds to serve 
alcoholic beverages under supervision and 
deregulating service area limitations; allowing 
restaurants to advertise happy hours; and, authorizing 
home brewing under certain conditions (22.11.2016). 
The Minister of Social Affairs and Health, Hanna Mäntylä 
(True Finns) justifies the suggested law mainly in 
economic terms: ‘Alcohol policy is also industrial policy, 
tourism, restaurants and employment’, while 
downplaying impacts on the national health: ‘We 
should expand the discussion from availability to 
reasons: why some people become excessive users and 
others do not’ (27.5.2016).  
The newfound political consensus seems strong, 
and it appears that the government has already chosen 
the policy that will be introduced, despite other 
stakeholders maintaining a heated discussion. Experts 
from the National Institute of Health and Welfare write 
about the dangers of the proposed new law (16.6.2016), 
arguing that Finnish policies should aim at harm 
reduction as in Sweden, not at economic development 
(19.10.2016). Representatives of Alko also continue to 
express concern over monopoly profits (11.11.2016). 
Opposing viewpoints are offered by the head of the 
Federation of the Brewing and Soft Drinks Industry and 
the Finnish Microbreweries Association, who highlight 
the benefits to the national economy from increased tax 
income due to reduced imports and increased 
employment. The Brewers also point out that the law is 
not radical, and the proposed steps are only minor 
(19.6.2016; 29.7.2016).  
In November 2016, the draft for the new alcohol act 
is opened for consultation for eight weeks (22.11.2016). 
The discussion in HS heats up. Alcohol researcher Peter 
Eriksson from the University of Helsinki argues in an 
opinion piece that the government is making a mistake. 
Finnish alcohol policy is already more relaxed than 
Swedish alcohol policy, which has ‘cost the country an 
additional 40 billion euros’. According to Eriksson, the 
law only reflects financial needs and brewing industry 
lobbying. A lobbyist for the European wine industry, 
Paul Skehan responds by stating that Nordic alcohol 
policies are based on a nanny-state ideology 
(4.12.2016). Coalition Party MP Jaana Pelkonen voices 
her support of relaxations by referring to economic 
growth and consumers’ right to choose. According to 
Pelkonen, strict control has only resulted in Finns not 
knowing how to self-regulate their drinking (8.1.2017).  
In March 2017, the HS reporting focuses on a letter 
that the Swedish alcohol monopoly company 
Systembolaget has addressed to the European 
Commission to oppose the Finnish alcohol law reform. 
Systembolaget expresses its concern that the proposed 
legal reform would cause serious damage to public 
health in Finland, and further increase Finnish drinking, 
described as already heavy. Nevertheless, HS reporting 
reveals that the arguments Systembolaget makes in its 
letter draw heavily on the views of Alko, which might 
mean that Alko encouraged Systembolaget to send it to 
safeguard its own position (28.3.2017). In Norway, 
Professor Ingeborg Rossow warns that alcohol law in 
Finland might also impact Norway, and Norway has 
expressed its concern about the proposed new Finnish 
alcohol law via EFTA (23.6.2017).  
In comparison to the VR or Veikkaus cases, the 
debate in the alcohol question is at times heated, 
including strong stakeholders with opposing views and 
differences of opinion between government parties. 
This also impacts the final legislative change, which 
concludes in an apparent compromise. The alcohol law 
is relaxed, but only slightly. In June 2017, the Finnish 
government introduced the new alcohol act, which was 
passed for a vote in the Parliament (23.6.2017). The law 
introduces alcoholic beverages containing over 5.5% 
alcohol in supermarkets, but not stronger alcohol or 
wine. After the decision is reached, criticism dies down, 
and in December 2017, the Parliament voted in favour 
of the law.  
 
Gambling 
Unlike the VR and Alko cases, the Finnish gambling 
monopoly was consolidated rather than dismantled 
during the studied period. The analysed material covers 
a period before and after a merger of three 
monopolistic actors, Veikkaus (the National Lottery 
company providing lotteries and sports betting), RAY 
(the Slot Machine association providing casino and 
Electronic Gambling Machine games) and Fintoto (the 
horse race betting provider) was announced in 2015. 
The new operator, also called Veikkaus, began its 
operation in 2017. A report by the Ministry of Interior 
(Sisäministeriö, 2015) justified the strengthening the 
Finnish monopoly system as the best possible option to 
prevent negative social and health-related impacts of 
gambling, but also to compete with and to channel 
demand away from online gambling operators. 
Furthermore, the merger was deemed necessary to 
align with the requirements of the European 
Commission. Although gambling has been excluded 
from EU directives, the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) and the EC have determined the 
conditions under which restrictions on national 
gambling markets are acceptable (European 
Commission, 2012).  
Discussion on the potential benefits and costs of a 
merger starts to emerge in HS reporting during 2014, 
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before the new policy is announced. An editorial 
(2.9.2014) argues that everybody would win in a 
merger, as it would ensure a better supply and more 
profit for beneficiaries. Prime Minister Alexander Stubb 
(Coalition Party) (2.12.2014) is quoted justifying the 
merger with the demands of the European Commission 
and the need to compete with international providers 
and. Minister of Interior Päivi Räsänen (Christian 
Democrats) similarly argues that the monopoly system 
must be strengthened urgently due to the changes 
taking place in the gambling field, particularly online, 
and to develop a ‘trustworthy gambling system’ 
(2.12.2014). 
The main stakeholders in addition to the 
government and providers, are civil society 
organisations (CSOs), which are important beneficiaries 
of gambling proceeds in Finland. In comparison to the 
railroad (VR) and alcohol monopoly (Alko) case, all 
stakeholders involved in public discussion regarding 
Veikkaus therefore have an interest in maintaining the 
state monopoly on gambling in one form or another. 
Although they support the monopoly, CSOs are 
initially critical of a merger. A representative of SOSTE, a 
central organisation of CSOs in the social and health 
sector, argues that the existing system of three 
monopolies is already accepted by the European 
Commission and that no additional benefit will be made 
by modifying it (4.9.2014). CSOs are also reported to see 
the merger as a threat to their income (2.12.2014). A 
representative of Hippos, an organisation representing 
the trotting and horse racing sectors, views the merger 
as a ‘great monster’. Hannu Tolonen from the Ministry 
of Education argues that the merger will set 
beneficiaries against each other to compete for funds.  
The criticism advances policy discussion to find the 
best alternative for gambling provision. In December 
2014, HS reports (16.12.2014) that the government has 
appointed a working group to find a solution to 
increased competition online and overlaps in the 
games provided by the national companies. Three 
possible solutions are presented: a merger, better 
grouping of games between operators, or clearer 
distinctions between the three providers’ games. A 
merger is presented as the best option. One month 
before the working group report is due (12.2.2015), 
Päivi Nerg from the Ministry of Interior defends the 
merger by claiming that a stronger monopoly actor 
would be able to compete better with international 
providers that are ‘intruding in the national market’. 
Ironically, and unlike in the VR and Alko cases, the 
gambling monopoly is justified in terms of competition 
rather than as a hurdle to it.   
Only at this point does consumer protection come 
up in the discussion, despite its status as the main 
official justification for the gambling monopoly 
(Marionneau 2015). A representative of the helpline for 
problem gamblers, Peluuri, (25.2.2015) points out that 
while the monopoly is officially justified in terms of 
preventing gambling harms, the discussion only 
centres around competition. The suggested monopoly 
merger will do little to prevent gambling problems. 
However, the comment does not suggest another 
policy option and remains isolated. 
In March 2015 (24.3.2015) HS reports that all political 
parties and beneficiaries suddenly agree on a merger. 
The newfound consensus is rather surprising, as even 
the previously critical beneficiaries are suddenly on 
board, suggesting that assurances on the continuation 
of their funding have been made. In September, a 
representative of the sports organisation and major 
beneficiary of gambling funds, VALO (17.9.2015) argues 
that the merger is positive for Finnish sports. Even 
Hippos is reportedly involved. Minister of Interior Päivi 
Räsänen also announces that the merger is expected to 
improve consumer protection, and thus public health, 
as ‘it is easier to control gambling when companies do 
not compete with each other’.  
Most critical analysis appears only after the merger 
has been announced. In September 2015 (19.9.2015), 
representatives from the market liberal thinktank, 
Libera, question whether a license system could have 
accomplished the same ends as a monopoly. In 2016, a 
researcher from the University of Helsinki argues that 
the merger is hypocritic since consumer protection was 
not a key concern but a mere justification for a decision 
that had already been made. Soon after, an expert in EU 
law presents the same view (25.4.2016), noting that the 
merger does not prevent foreign competition. A 
licensing model would have at least been able to exert 
control over foreign operators, as well as bringing in 
new investment. However, these comments had little 
impact at this stage, as the political consensus had been 
strong enough to withhold criticism in the crucial 
preparatory part of the merger process. The 
stakeholders that were included at the preparatory 
phase of the reform were all in favour of maintaining the 
monopoly.  
 
Discussion 
The analysis shows how the three different policy 
processes unfolded in the Finnish public discussion, 
reflecting different political trajectories that state 
monopolies followed. Even within a similar national and 
international context as VR and Alko, the position of 
Veikkaus seems immune to any derogations. This 
difference cannot be attributed solely to the special 
position of gambling in European societies, as the 
strong and actively consolidated Finnish gambling 
monopoly is also exceptional within this framework in 
which gambling monopolies have increasingly been 
privatized or markets opened to licensing. A more likely 
explanation follows from the peculiar way in which 
gambling has been organised in the Finnish national 
context, implicating several beneficiaries and 
stakeholders across the society. Stakeholders here are 
defined as government actors as well as non-
governmental interest groups, understood as 
organisations articulating societal interests that seek to 
shape public policies (e.g., Beyers, Eising, & Maloney, 
2008).  The significant role of stakeholders in gambling, 
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and how it deviated from the two other monopoly cases 
can be seen on at least three different levels in the 
public discussion on gambling.   
First, the stakeholders had varying interests in the 
monopoly cases. Based on the reporting analysed in this 
study, the main difference between Veikkaus and the 
two other monopolies was the active support of all 
financial stakeholders to maintain it (also Marionneau & 
Kankainen, 2018) while critical voices were not present. 
Although policy developments occurred in each case 
and consensus was eventually reached, this process was 
more rapid and less subject to tensions in the Veikkaus 
case. The de-monopolization of railroad passenger 
traffic and relaxations in alcohol retail law emerged 
from the political ideology of the new market liberal 
government, followed by policy proposals and 
problematizations. The trajectory therefore followed 
the MSF model more closely. The consolidation of the 
gambling monopoly did not start from a similar 
ideological premise. Rather, the strengthening of the 
monopoly was contrary to the overall policy objectives 
of the government. Instead, the public discussion 
moved quickly and without much debate by departing 
from problematizations and leaving little space for 
criticism (see Figure 1).    
Furthermore, in the cases of railway traffic and 
alcohol, support for the monopoly structure was 
expressed mainly by representatives of the existing 
monopolies. This is not very surprising given that their 
monopoly position would otherwise be weakened. In 
the Veikkaus case, not only representatives of the 
company, but also its wide network of beneficiaries, 
voiced support for the monopoly. This gives further 
explanation to why critical voices were limited in the 
Veikkaus case. In the VR and Alko cases, private 
entrepreneurs and commercial actors, as well as 
representatives of political parties that support more 
liberal market environments voiced support for 
deregulation. In the Veikkaus case, the public and the 
third sectors, including the state and political actors are 
also implicated as beneficiaries of the sector. This makes 
political actors partisans of the merger, limiting 
discussion of other options. Previous research has also 
shown that the support for maintaining the Finnish 
gambling monopoly is exceptionally strong not only 
among the gambling population (Salonen & Raisamo, 
2015) but also beneficiaries of gambling proceeds 
(Marionneau & Kankainen, 2018) and political parties 
(Allianssi, 2019). 
The second way in which stakeholder positions 
differed in the three cases follows from the aligned 
economic interests of stakeholders in the Veikkaus case. 
Gambling provides significant financial returns which 
translate into more significant economic power of the 
gambling company in comparison to that of VR or Alko. 
The position of VR and Alko had already seen some 
derogations before the analyzed period, but Veikkaus 
has remained the sole provider of all gambling products 
in Finland and the analysis showed a strong political will 
to maintain and to further consolidate this monopoly 
policy. The scrutiny of the European Union institutions 
in the Finnish gambling policy particularly following the 
1999 CJEU ruling in the Läära case and the infringement 
proceedings closed in 2013 further evoked some fears 
that the EU would transfer competencies in the field of 
gambling to Brussels (also Littler, 2011; Marionneau, 
2015). It is likely that one of the reasons behind the 
merger of the Finnish gambling operators was also to 
prevent further scrutiny. In the 2015 Ministry of Interior 
report (Sisäministeriö, 2015), the merger was justified in 
terms of maintaining and strengthening the monopoly 
system.  
Third, stakeholders employed varying justifications 
used in the media discussions. Justifications show how 
conditions become seen as problematic, and the kind of 
framing that takes place. In the VR case, justifications for 
the monopoly initially drew on the quality of service, 
but as the discussion advanced, sentimental and 
nationalistic arguments appeared, such as safeguarding 
national possessions. Justifications for the de-
monopolization of VR drew on industrial and economic 
arguments, such as improved service, consumer choice, 
and pricing, but also environmental issues. Similar 
industrial and economic justifications were used in 
support of the new alcohol law in the Alko case, 
including competitiveness, job creation, and economic 
growth. Justifications against the new alcohol law were 
based on safeguarding the position of Alko but also on 
public health. In the Veikkaus case, justifications for the 
merger are initially based on economic arguments. This 
is surprising because unlike in the other cases, 
restrictions rather than liberalizations are justified in 
terms of market competition. Justifications supporting 
the merger only later turn to issues related to public 
health, at which point those opposing the merger 
adopt economic arguments. This finding is in line with 
the analysis of Jensen on the Norwegian and Danish 
gambling monopolies (2017) according to which 
monopolies on gambling provision are maintained 
mainly to cater to established and path-dependent 
financial interests, while health-related argumentation 
is only utilised when dependencies on revenues 
become less significant. Following Boltanski and 
Thévenots’ (2006) theory of justification, different 
justifications reflect varying sets of values. Unlike the 
other monopoly cases, in the gambling case, a similar 
type of economic justification was highlighted on both 
sides, allowing for a higher level of accord and 
consensus in public discussion.  
How an actual political consensus is reached cannot 
be determined based on this analysis and would require 
further studies. Nordic welfare states are known for a 
consensus seeking political culture, which also explains 
part of the popularity of the gambling monopoly, but 
not why it deviates from the other monopoly cases. In a 
comparison with other Finnish monopoly systems, 
gambling remains special, and the results of this study 
suggest that this is mainly due to the shared economic 
interests of all included stakeholders. 
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Conclusion 
This study compared Finnish state monopolies in rail 
traffic, alcohol and gambling to analyse whether the 
exceptional Finnish monopoly position in gambling is 
specific to the gambling sector or of Finnish monopoly 
policies in general. Using a diachronic approach to 
analyse media data and the MSF model as a conceptual 
tool, we identified how changes in monopoly structures 
are negotiated, the terms in which they are justified, 
and how these policies find support in public 
discussion. 
 
The analysis suggests that when consensus-seeking 
appears to be a leading value in policy processes, as in 
Finland, policy change can be rapid when necessary 
conditions are aligned. In the case of Veikkaus, the need 
for reform was framed by finding jointly acceptable 
justifications to problematize the condition, and shared 
interest of principal stakeholders. While such a system 
leaves little space for diverging options and opinions, it 
appears to be an effective way to introduce change. 
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